IMPLIED REVOCATION OF WILLS AFTER DIVORCE
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

S

OME OF THE DIFFICULTIES that may be engendered by the doctrine of
implied revocation of wills, following a change in the testator's marital
status, 1 are illustrated by the recent decision in Younker v. Johnson.2
In that case the testator and his wife were married on February 28,
I898. After 39 years of marriage, the defendant obtained a divorce
decree which confirmed a fair and equitable property division. The
testator died leaving a will under the terms of which the defendant
was devisee of one-half of all property of which the testator was
seized at his death. It further appeared that the will was made one
and one-half years before the testator and the defendant were divorced,
and thirteen and one-half years prior to his death. The Probate Court
held that the will had been revoked by implication as to the defendant.
That decision was reversed by the court of appeals, and the record was
certified to the Ohio Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court
held, five to two, that the divorce decree coupled with the settlement
of property rights compelled the conclusion that the will provision
wherein the defendant was benefited was impliedly revoked.
It is uniformly held, absent a statute to the contrary, that divorce
does not, per-se, revoke those parts of a will which benefit a divorced
spouse.' There is, however, a split of authority as to whether divorce,
coupled with. a settlement of property, constitutes such an implied revocation. 4 This divergence among jurisdictions is attributable, in most
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instances, to variations in their statutes governing will revocationparticularly in those provisions pertaining to the effect of a divorce and
property settlement on a pre-existing will.
The most uncommon type of statutory provision expressly provides
that a divorce, in itself, revokes those portions of a pre-existing will
which confer benefits on a divorced spouse.'
A second type of statutory provision enumerates the methods by
which a will may be revoked, but makes no mention of implied revocation by changes in condition and circumstances.' Here, the courts have
refrained from applying the doctrine of implied revocation, and have
held the statutory methods to be exclusive.'
Another type of statutory provision-the type under which Younker
v. Johnson was decided 8-enumerates the standard methods by which a
will may be revoked, and then provides, "but nothing herein contained
shall prevent the revocation implied by law, from subsequent changes
in the condition and circumstances of the testator."9 Under this type
of statutory provision, divorce coupled with property settlement is generally held to constitute such a change of condition as to compel the
implied revocation of those portions of a will which would enure to the
benefit of a divorced spouse, 10 an irrebuttable presumption to that effect
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frequently being created."1 Nothwithstanding this general rule, however, there is a minority view which maintains that since this statutory
provision merely codifies the common law doctrine of implied revocation, then only those changes of circumstance sufficient to effect a revocation at common law will suffice under the statute.1 2 At common law,
those changes recognized as sufficient to revoke a will by implication of
law were quite dear: as to a woman, marriage was held to revoke a
will which she had executed before her marriage5' 3 as to a man, marriage plus the birth of issue was considered to be a change of circumstance
sufficient to revoke a will executed prior to his marriage. 4 Accordingly,
the doctrine of implied revocation of wills upon change of the testator's
condition and circumstances is thus limited in those jurisdictions where
the minority view prevails.
Thus, while states do have statutory provisions recognizing that
wills may be revoked by implication, it is significant that judicial construction thereof has precluded inquiry, in any particular case, into the
validity of the premise upon which the doctrine is founded-namely, a
presumption of a change in the testator's intention, brought about by a
change in certain conditions and circumstances.' 5 In short, what had
(i9o9); In re Martin's Estate, 1o9 Neb. 289, 19o N.W. 872 (1922); In re
Kort's Estate, 260 Wis. 621, 51 N.W.2d 5o (x952); In re Battis, 143 Ws. 234,
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of condition and circumstances to warrant a revocation).
" In re McGraw's Estate, Wirth v. Wirth, Donaldson v. Hall; In re Martin's
Estate; In re Kort's Estate; In re Battis, all cited in note z o supra.
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been formulated as workable rules for determining probable testamentary intent have been crystallized into invariable rules of substantive law.1" The distortion and injustice that may result from such
extension of a rule beyond the logical limits of its principle is illustrated
in the Younker case. The particular facts there did not justify the
Ohio court's holding that the will had impliedly been revoked. The
couple had been married for forty-one years5 and the will was executed
only six months before the divorce proceedings were begun, evidencing
a desire by the testator to provide for his wife-a desire extending even
into the waning moments of their marriage. The same attorney who
drafted the decedent's will also represented him in the divorce proceedings.' 7 As Judge Taft, in dissent, intimated:
Is it reasonable to infer that counsel.., did not then advise the
husband to revoke the will if he did not want his wife to take
under it?'"
Also to be considered is the fact that the testator lived for twelve years
after the divorce and settlement, kept the will in a safe deposit box
along with a number of other valuable papers, and died without taking
steps to revoke or destroy it. As Judge Taft further pointed out:
Is it reasonable to assume that the husband, notwithstanding the
divorce and property settlement, intended that his wife of over
forty years and the mother of his children, should take on his
death what he would no longer need, and what he had provided
for her in his will? Notwithstanding the divorce and property
settlement, it is not unlikely that he still had a continuing interest
in the welfare of his former wife. If he did not intend for her
to take under his will, he could easily have revoked it. He did
not. Why should this court do it for him on the doubtful assumption that he would have wanted it that way?'
Thus, the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the Younker case
seems to have been based not on its conception of the probable intent
of the testator-the very raison d'etre of the doctrine of implied revocation-but rather on rigid application of a rule of substantive law that
a divorce coupled with a property settlement is in itself a sufficient
change of condition to require the revocation of those provisions of a
pre-existing will which benefit a divorced spouse.
"oIllustrative of the adherence of courts to rules of substantive law rather than to
rules for determining probable testamentary intent are the cases cited in notes 7 and it
sutpra.
17 Brief for Appellee, p. 6, Younker v. Johnson,
116 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio, s954).
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There is, of course, considerable justification for such a decision.
It must be conceded that in the vast majority of cases the testator's failure to revoke his will subsequent to a divorce is due to neglect, and
that to find an implied revocation usually gives effect to a testator's real
intentions. Moreover, emphasis on the demonstrable probable intent
of the testator, formed after he has executed the will, would probably
invite fraud and perjury. ° In view of these factors, many courts understandably would prefer to rely unequivocally on a rule of law which is
essentially sound, although pursuant thereto they might occasionally be
forced to disregard the probable intent of the testator. Nevertheless,
it is clear that such a construction is inconsistent with the principle upon
which the doctrine of implied revocation rests. It is submitted that
the better treatment of this case would have been to find a presumption
of intended revocation as to any provision of a pre-existing will benefiting a divorced spouse, rebuttable, however, by dear and convincing
proof of the testator's intention to give his divorced spouse the benefit
2
of the provision of the will. '
GARY S. STEIN
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